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EFFECTS AND VALUE OF VERIFIABLE INFORMATION IN A
CONTROVERSIAL MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM LAB AUCTIONS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
MATTHEW ROUSU, WALLACE E. HUFFMAN, JASON F. SHOGREN and ABEBAYEHU TEGENE*
Food products containing genetically modified (GM) ingredients have entered the
market over the past decade. The biotech industry and environmental groups have
disseminated conflicting private information about GM foods. This paper develops
a unique methodology for valuing independent third-party information in such a
setting and applies this method to consumers’ willingness to pay for food products
that might be GM. Data are collected from real consumers in an auction market
setting with randomized information and labeling treatments. The average value
of third-party information per lab participant is small, but the public good value
across U.S. consumers is shown to be quite large. (JEL C91, D12, D82)
I. INTRODUCTION
If all information regarding new products is
public, consumers can search out this informa-
tion and make informed decisions (Hirshleifer
and Riley 1992; Stigler 1961), but the available
information is typically incomplete and asym-
metric. That is, some effects of the new com-
modities/technologies on consumers and the
environment are either unknown or only pri-
vately known (private information) by noncon-
sumers. With private information, the informed
and interested parties frequently have an incen-
tive to use their private information strategically
(Akerlof 1970; Molho 1997), for example, to
beneficially affect market conditions.
Foods made using bioengineering, often re-
ferred to as genetically modified (GM) foods,
are examples of new goods with largely the
same set of attributes as conventional foods,
but that are produced using new agricultural
technologies about which consumers might
have positive or negative preferences. These
new raw materials have been produced with
crop varieties that contain one or more trans-
genic genes—genes that have been moved
across species using the gene splicing technol-
ogy of Cohen and Boyer and that could not be
moved using conventional sexual reproduc-
tion (Cohen et al. 1973; Huffman and Evenson
2006, 167–75). The transgenic traits of these
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innovations relate to the insertion of herbi-
cide-tolerant and insect-resistant genes from
soil bacteria into crop varieties, which can
be expected to reduce farmers’ production
costs for raw food and thereby possibly to
reduce food prices to consumers. However,
this technology has not created commercially
available foods that consumers value directly,
for example, reduced bruising or enhanced
protein or vitamin content. Genetically engi-
neered crop varieties for enhanced input traits
burst upon the frontier of agricultural technol-
ogies in the mid-1990s with herbicide-tolerant
soybeans and insect-resistant cotton varieties.1
Since then, herbicide-tolerant cotton, corn,
and canola varieties and insect-resistant corn
varieties have been successfully developed and
marketed to American farmers (Fernandez-
Cornejo and Caswell 2006). Soybeans and
corn and canola seeds are important U.S.
sources of vegetable oil, corn is a principal
source of sweetener, and corn and soybeans
are significant sources of other ingredients
for processed foods. Tomatoes bioengineered
for extended shelf life (Flavr-Savr) and pota-
toes for insect resistance were also approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
in the early 1990s, but these products failed
commercially after a few years on the market
and were withdrawn.
The early GM crop varieties made available
to U.S. farmers were developed and marketed
principally by two large chemical companies:
Monsanto and Syngenta. As has been the case
in U.S. agriculture for at least six decades,
these companies have extensively advertised
their perceived positive benefits of these new
crop varieties, sharing a type of private infor-
mation. Given that financial interests in bio-
technology, these probiotech parties have used
their private information selectively or strate-
gically to expand the size of the market for
GM crops by emphasizing that GM crops
would enhance environmental quality, increase
food availability, and reduce world hunger
(Council for Biotechnology Information 2001).
In contrast, environmental nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), including Greenpeace
and Friends of the Earth, have countered by
asserting that foods made from GM plant
materials might harm human health by intro-
ducing new allergens (e.g., see ‘‘Frankenfoods,’’
Greenpeace International 2003), harm the
environment by possibly outcrossing with na-
tive species, reduce genetic diversity, prevent
farmers from saving their own seed for future
plantings, or give excessive market power to
multinational companies (Greenpeace Inter-
national 2001a; 2000b; 2000c; Friends of the
Earth 2003). Such diverse and conflicting infor-
mationleadstopotentialconfusionamongcon-
sumers (and possibly agricultural producers).
Similarly, public officials are also faced with
a situation of information asymmetry and
may not be able to discern socially optimal
policies for GM crop varieties and GM foods,
or their short- and long-run social welfare ef-
fects (Hausman 2003).
In principle, society can avoid losses due to
strategic behaviors of interested parties toward
new technologies and products if decision
makers can access independent third-party
or verifiable information (Huffman and Tegene
2002; Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Verifiable
information provides an objective assessment
of the benefits and costs, including environmen-
tal and health risks, of GM crop varieties and
foods made from these raw materials.
The overall objective of this paper is to
develop a unique methodology for valuing
independent third-party information in such
asettingandtoapplythismethodtoconsumers’
willingness topay(WTP)forfoodproductsthat
might beGM.Data are collected fromreal con-
sumers participating in an auction market set-
tingwith randomized information and labeling
treatments. Our methodology improves upon
the standardprotocolof experimental econom-
ics, where undergraduate students are the auc-
tion participants and they are put through
a long set of nonrandomized treatments (e.g.,
Fox et al. 2002; Shogren et al. 1994).2 Applying
1. A herbicide-tolerant crop variety is created by
transferring a soil bacteria into the plant that is resistant
to a chemical herbicide, for example, Round-Up, and then
when this variety is planted, farmers can apply Round-Up
and kill all the plants in the field except for the Round-Up-
tolerant crop variety. An insect-resistant crop variety is
created by transferring soil bacteria that is toxic to com-
mon plant insects, for example, the cotton boll and bud
worm, European Corn borer. In this case, biological con-
trol rather than a toxic chemical pesticide is used to con-
trol the target insect.
2. In designing the experiments, we combine the best
attributes of survey design, statistical experimental design,
and experimental economics to obtain a superior overall
experimental design. Our methodology differs signifi-
cantly from the telephone survey used by Mendenhall
and Evenson (2002) to solicit information about consum-
ers’ risk perceptions of GM foods and hypothetical WTP
a premium for non-GM foods.
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our method for valuing third-party informa-
tion, we show that verifiable information in
the GM food market has potentially large
and statistically significant social value.
II. BACKGROUND
For millennia, individuals involved in culti-
vation of land have engaged in a rudimentary
form of genetic modification in an attempt to
augment the desirable attributes of their crops.
They have selected the most productive and
hardiest seeds from each year’s harvest for
use in subsequent plantings. However, since
the early 1990s, genetic modification has been
associated with a much narrower set of tech-
niques that use recombinant deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) or gene splicing technology to
facilitate the transfer of genes across species.3
Foods made using this type of GM material
are known commonly as GM foods.
The on-going controversy over GM food
products and the perceived importance of
facilitating informed food purchases have
stimulated interest in food labeling, identity
preservation, and new sources of information
(Caswell 2000). For example, Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth advocate mandatory
labeling for GM content, asserting that label-
ing would benefit consumers by enabling them
to easily chose whether or not to consume
products containing GM content (Friends of
the Earth 2001; Greenpeace International
2006). Some international NGOs have made
GM foods their number one issue (Nestle
2003).
Before 1990, food labels were largely unreg-
ulated. But the 1990 Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act dramatically changed nutrition
labels on packages of food sold in U.S. super-
markets (Balasubramanian and Cole 2002;
Caswell 2000). This law requires packaged
foods to display nutritional information prom-
inently in a new label format, namely the Nu-
trition Facts panel. It also regulates health
claims and descriptor terms on food packages.
If the proposal by environmental groups for
GM food labels were adopted, the label would
be a negative label denoting the ‘‘use of GM
ingredients.’’ However, GM content has not
been proven scientifically to have human
health consequences, except for the transport
of some known allergens to new locations.
Hence, today, GM food labels would not meet
the nutrition labeling requirement of nutrient
intake, leading to proven health outcomes.
In 1992, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services issued a regulation that
GM food did not need to be labeled if the food
product had the same food characteristics as
its non-GM counterparts, that is, contained
the same basic attributes. In January 2001,
the FDA issued a ‘‘Guidance for Industry’’
statement reaffirming this policy stating that
the only GM foods requiring labels are foods
with characteristics different from those of
their non-GM counterpart. Currently, label-
ing food for GM content is not required for
any other food. Under the current rules and
regulations governing the food industry,
a GM labeling initiative could be implemented
either by manufacturers voluntarily or the
FDA would need to change its policy. How-
ever, if a voluntary label is affixed to a food
product, the FDA hasmandated that it cannot
use the phrase ‘‘genetically modified.’’ The
FDA preferred the phrase ‘‘genetically engi-
neered’’ or ‘‘made through biotechnology.’’
In contrast, the European Union (EU) and
most other Western European countries have
strong labeling and tracking requirements for
GM content.
In Europe, international environmental
groups were effective in lobbying governments
with their platform that ‘‘consumers have
the right to know whether their food is GM
or not’’ (Greenpeace International 2001a). In
1997, the European Commission enacted a
mandatory GM food labeling policy. The
Commission required each member country
to enact a law requiring labeling of all new
products containing substances derived from
GM organisms. In October 2003, the Euro-
pean Parliament passed more stringent label-
ing legislation requiring that food and feed
that contain at least 0.9% of 1% of GM con-
tent must be labeled as GM and that traceabil-
ity of the product from the farm to the
consumer must be maintained.
In the EU, mandatory labeling has led to
the curious result that no (or very little)
GM foods are being sold in grocery stores
3. In 1973, Cohen and Boyer discovered the basic
technique for recombinant DNA, which launched a new
field of genetic engineering. The Cohen-Boyer patent on
gene splicing technology was awarded in 1980 to Stanford
University and the University of California (Office of
Technology Assessment 1989). They built on the 1953 dis-
covery by Watson and Crick of the structure of DNA and
of the suggestion about how it replicates.
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and supermarkets. Once the label requirement
went into effect, the environmental groups
mounted a major negative information
campaign against GM products. The result
was reduced demand by EU consumers and
then the gradual disappearance of GM prod-
ucts from store shelves. In effect, the imple-
mentation of mandatory labeling of GM
food resulted in a reduction in the variety of
foods available for consumers (Carter and
Gruere 2003).
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and at least nine other countries
have also passed mandatory GM labeling
requirements (Carter and Gruere 2003). How-
ever, labeling involves additional real costs,
such as testing for the presence of GM, segre-
gating crops, monitoring for truthfulness in
labeling, enforcement of existing regulations,
and risk premiums for being out of contract
(Wilson and Dahl 2005).
An effective labeling policy requires the use
of scarce resources to maintain an effective
‘‘segregation’’ system or an ‘‘identity preserva-
tion system.’’4 To the extent that there is amar-
ket for non-GM crops, buyers would be
expected to specify in their purchase contracts
some limit on GM content and/or precise pre-
scriptions regarding production/marketing/
handling processes (Wilson and Dahl 2005).
One can envision a marketplace of buyers
who have differentiated demand according
to their risk tolerance for GM content. To
make this differentiation meaningful, new
costs and risks are incurred. Additional testing
for GM content involves the costs of deciding
which test to use, among those with varying
accuracy, and then conducting the test. If
non-GM is the ‘‘superior commodity,’’ then
there is the risk that GM and non-GM varie-
ties will be commingled, and then with some
positive probability, the GM content will be
detected in shipments to customers, and the
shipment will be rejected. This is a serious eco-
nomic problem as agents seek to determine the
optimal strategy for testing and mitigating risk.
Limited evidence from related consumer
acceptance studies suggests that consumers
behave as if they have an asymmetric value
function in that they seem to act on ‘‘bad’’
news in a controversial market while heavily
discounting ‘‘good’’ news (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Viscusi (1997) and Fox et al.
(2002) concluded that individuals amplify
the risks of a neoteric product and discount
benefits. Using a survey in which consumers
received divergent information on environ-
mental risks, Viscusi showed that consumers
place greater weight on information from
the expert who provided a high-risk assess-
ment. They did so regardless of whether the
low-risk assessment came from a government
or an industry source. A similar ‘‘alarmist’’
reaction to a new product was observed by
Fox et al. (2002) in laboratory auctions of irra-
diated meat. In agreement with intuition, they
found that a favorable description of irradia-
tion increased demand and an unfavorable
description decreased demand. However, when
consumers were presented with both favorable
and unfavorable descriptions, they bid as if
they had used only the negative information,
resulting in a dramatic decline in demand for-
irradiated meat despite the fact that the
negative information was presented in a non-
scientific manner by a consumer advocacy
group.
Consistent with models of choice under risk
(e.g., loss aversion, status quo bias, Bayesian
updating), this result illustrates the incentive
for partisan groups to promote unscientific
claims for private gain. The important ques-
tion that studies of Viscusi and Fox et al.
do not address is the social value of introduc-
ing verifiable information into a market where
a controversial product is for sale. From this,
we might hypothesize that verifiable informa-
tion is most valuable under a voluntary label-
ing policy, as in the United States, Canada,
and Argentina, but not a mandatory policy,
as in the EU and Japan.
Stigler (1961), Hirshleifer and Riley (1992),
Molho (1997), and Morris and Shin (2002)
provide general frameworks for placing an
economic value on information. Foster and
Just (1989) devised an applied methodology
for assessing the value of government infor-
mation about insecticide contamination (hep-
tachlor) of milk for human consumption in
Hawaii. They used market-level data to calcu-
late the value of government information as
the difference between rational consumers’
choices under incomplete and more complete
information. In our study, we use informa-
tion obtained from experimental auctions
where participants/consumers are provided
4. Wilson and Dahl (2005) estimate that the cost of
segregation with a varietal declaration system is much less
expensive than for an identity preservation system.
412 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
with randomly assigned information and
labeling treatments. By using an experimental
market, we are able to obtain precise informa-
tion on consumers’ reactions to the injection
of verifiable information when information
from interested parties is already available.
Further, our methodology can be applied to
assess consumer responses to other new goods
when interested parties might have propa-
gated scientifically unfounded conflicting
information.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
With two interested parties disseminating
conflicting information into a market for a
new good, what are rational consumers likely
to do? Consumers should be able to make
informed decisions provided (a) they are so-
phisticated enough to understand the techni-
cal processes at work and to recognize that
interested parties provide information reflect-
ing their own private interests and (b) they can
verify all the information provided (Milgrom
and Roberts 1986). Unfortunately, a full and
verifiable information environment does not
characterize the market for GM food products
[also see Mendenhall and Evenson (2002)].
Genetic modification through bioengineering
is a complex process, and not all GM infor-
mation is currently verifiable. Additionally,
the search costs for most consumers to find
neutral information is very high, as there
are contradictory messages describing GM
food as ‘‘food to feed the planet,’’ as well as
‘‘Frankenfood’’ [see, e.g., Gates (2001)]. Be-
cause of these high search costs, an indepen-
dent third-party source providing verifiable
information about genetic modification has
potentially large public good value (Huffman
and Tegene 2002).
We design a set of experiments to incorpo-
rate the private information revealing features
of experimental auction markets similar to the
experiments described by Smith (1976) and
Fox et al. (2002), and then introduce rigorous
randomized treatment effects from the field of
statistical experimental design. Although we
conduct two practice rounds of bidding on
common goods to learn our auction process,
our main results follow from information col-
lected from two rounds of bidding on the
experimental food products where the experi-
mental design consists of six biotech informa-
tion labeling treatments randomly assigned to
sessions or trials with two replications. Each
session consists of 13–16 adult consumers drawn
randomly from the households of two major
Midwestern cities.5 Iowa State University’s
Center for Survey Statistics and Methods
(CSSM) contacted prospective participants
and offered them the opportunity to partici-
pate in an Iowa State University project deal-
ing with consumers’ decisions on food and
household products. Individuals were told
that they would need to come to a common
location, a lab or classroom, that the project
would take about 90 min of their time, and
that they would be paid $40 for participating.
We anticipated that consumers would have
heterogeneous tastes for food ingredients and
methods of production. Given the sizeable
fixed cost of conducting a laboratory experi-
ment even with one commodity, we conjec-
tured that using three somewhat different
experimental food items in an auction would
be only marginally more expensive. We chose
to use in our auctions vegetable oil (made from
soybeans), tortilla chips (made from yellow
corn), and Russet potatoes. At the time of
the planned experiments, these food products
could have been made using GM ingredients
or technology. Furthermore, in the distilling
and refining processes for vegetable oils, essen-
tially all the proteins (which are the compo-
nents of DNA and the source of genetic
modification) are removed, leaving pure lipids.
Hence, for GM oils, minimal human health
concerns should arise, but consumers might
be concerned about GM soybeans having
adverse effects on the environment. Tortilla
chips are highly processed foods that may
be made from GM or non-GM corn, and con-
sumers might have human health and environ-
mental concerns. Russet potatoes are purchased
as a fresh product and are generally baked or
fried before eating. As with tortilla chips, con-
sumers might perceive human health and en-
vironmental risks from eating GM Russet
potatoes.
The CSSM obtained randomly selected res-
idence telephone numbers from each of the
metropolitan areas and contacted these num-
bers to find eligible participants. Participants
were asked to come on a particular Saturday
in April, 2001 and to choose one of three
5. A ‘‘session’’ in experimental economics is equiva-
lent to an ‘‘experimental unit’’ in statistical experimental
design literature.
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different starting times: 9 a.m., 11:30 a.m. or 2
p.m. Participation per household was limited
to two adults, and they were assigned to differ-
ent sessions. The CSSM followed up by send-
ing willing participants a letter containing
more information, including the date and
location, a map, and a telephone number to
contact for more information. The response
rate was about 19%, and the total number
of participants or sample size for this study
is 172, which is large compared to most exper-
imental auctions.
The protocol for an auction day and ses-
sions is critical to the success of the experi-
ments. Each auction session is conducted by
one of two session monitors, and it consists
of the same exact ten steps, which are sum-
marized in Figure 1. In Step 1, when partic-
ipants arrive, the host assigns them to a
particular session and monitor. The monitor
asks them to sign a consent form agreeing to
participate in the session. After participants
sign this form, the monitor gives them $40
for participating and an ID number to pre-
serve their anonymity. The participants then
are asked to read a brief set of instructions
and to complete a short questionnaire asking
for socio-demo-economic information and
attitudes toward several types of biological
technologies.
In Step 2, participants learn the auction
mechanism of a random nth price auction.
In the random nth price auction (Shogren
et al. 2001), an object is auctioned to n bidders,
for example n 5 13, and auction rules require
each player to submit a private bid (a nonneg-
ative number). The envelopes are then col-
lected by the auctioneer or session monitor,
and the n bids are ranked from highest to low-
est. Next, the session monitor draws a single
number from a discrete uniform distribution
over 1 to the subset of positive integers from
1 to n, for example, 5. In this case, the four
highest bidders are the winners, and they each
pay the fifth highest price.6 This auction mech-
anism is incentive compatible, as it gives every
bidder an incentive to bid his or her own true
value. However, unlike the Vickery or second
price auction, n  1 of the bidders have a
chance to be winners. Thus, the random nth
price auction does a better job of keeping all
bidders engaged in the auction relative to
other demand-revealing auctions like the
Vickery auction and the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (Lusk and Rousu forthcoming;
Shogren et al. 2001). We do not conduct
a repeated-round auction with posted prices,
where bidders place bids on identical items
across a number of rounds and adjust their
bids based on information revealed in other
bidders’ prices. For a summary of how
repeated rounds in auctions affect bidding
behavior, see Corrigan and Rousu (2006).7
The session monitor then writes an example
of the nth price auction on the blackboard.
After participants learn the general attributes
of the auction, a short quiz is administered to
the participants to test their understanding of
the auction mechanism. Note that throughout
the auction, when a participant is bidding on
an item in a particular round, he or she does
not know if additional rounds will occur. Par-
ticipants are assured, however, that at most
they will purchase only one unit of any auc-
tioned item. This has two advantages. First,
it eliminates price reduction because a bidder
has a negatively sloped demand curve for any
commodity. Second, it significantly reduces
concerns that participants might have about
financial liquidity, given that they were not
told in advance that they would be participat-
ing in a real auction.
Step 3 is the first ‘‘practice round of bid-
ding’’ in which participants bid on a brand-
name candy bar. The participants are asked
to examine the product and then place
a (sealed) bid. The bids are collected by the ses-
sion monitor and ordered from 1 to n. The first
round of practice bidding is then completed.
Step 4 is a second round of practice bidding.
In this round, each participant in a session bids
separately on a set of three items. This is to pro-
vide experience in bidding on more than one
item at a time. The items are a brand-name
candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and a box
of pens. The participants are asked to examine
the three items and place bids on each product
separately. Then the bids are collected by the
session monitor and ordered from highest to
6. If there are ties, this can increase the number of win-
ners to greater than n  1.
7. The view of our advisors from the Department of
Statistics, Iowa State University, was that putting an indi-
vidual through many rounds of bidding would change his/
her behavior because of the experience, and so we were
encouraged to keep the total number of bidding rounds
per participant to a very small number, two. This is in con-
trast to most economics experiments where individuals are
put through a long nonrandomized sequence of rounds of
bidding.
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FIGURE 1
Steps in the Experiments
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 4
Step 6
Step 5
Step 7 Step 8
Step 9 Step 10
Fills consent form and
questionnaire; receives
$40 and I.D. number
Candy bar
auction
Auction of a candy
bar, a deck of cards,
and a box of pens
Binding practice round
and binding nth prices
are revealed
Pro-biotechnology
Anti-biotechnology
Both Pro- and Anti-
biotechnology
Pro-biotechnology and
third-party information
Anti-biotechnology and
third-party information
Both Pro- and Anti-
biotechnology and third-
party information
First round of bidding
on food products
Second round of bidding
on food products
Binding food round
and binding nth prices
are revealed
Post-auction
questionnaire; winning
people purchase goods
N-th price auction is
explained
ROUSU ET AL: LAB AUCTIONS IN A CONTROVERSIAL MARKET 415
lowest. Of the two practice rounds, only one is
chosen as binding (valid).
In Step 5, the binding round (randomly cho-
sen between practice sessions 1 and 2) and the
binding nth prices are revealed to bidders. All
the bids from the two practice rounds are writ-
ten on the blackboard, and the nth price is cir-
cled for each of the products. Bidders are then
told whether they are a ‘‘winner’’ and the mar-
ket-clearing price that they are to pay on bind-
ing bids. The bidders are told by the session
monitor that all payment of money for goods
will take place after the experimental session.
Step 6 is the first round of bidding on the
experimental food products—vegetable oil,
tortilla chips, and potatoes—that might be
GM. A randomly assigned information treat-
ment is injected into each session at this point
for these food items. The information treat-
ments consist of packages of one or more of
the following perspectives on agricultural bio-
technology: (1) the industry (probiotech) per-
spective—a collection of mainly positive or
optimistic statements and information on ge-
netic modification provided by a group of
leading biotechnology companies, including
Monsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental
group (antibiotech) perspective—a collection
of mainly negative statements and informa-
tion on genetic modification fromGreenpeace,
a leading environmental group; and (3) the
third-party (verifiable information) perspective
—an objective statement on genetic modifica-
tion, as of the date of the experiments,
approved by a third-party group consisting
of a variety of individuals knowledgeable
about GM goods, including scientists, profes-
sionals, religious leaders, and academics, none
of whom have a financial stake in GM foods.
To assist the participants in processing these
different perspectives, the volume of infor-
mation is limited to one 8.50  110 page that
is organized into five categories—general in-
formation, scientific impact, human impact,
financial impact, and environmental impact
—in order to ease the information processing
load on participants. Figures 2–4 display the
exact layout and wording of the three perspec-
tives on genetic modification.
The three types of information are organized
into six information treatments: (i) probiotech-
nology information, (ii) antibiotechnology in-
formation, (iii) pro- and antibiotechnology
information, (iv) probiotechnology and third-
party verifiable information, (v) antibiotech-
nology and third-party verifiable information,
and (vi) probiotechnology, antibiotechnology,
and third-party verifiable information. These
six combinations are randomly assigned to
12 experimental sessions with two replications
(Figure 5).8 The sequence of information in
treatments containing more than one type of
information is as follows. If the treatment con-
tained both probiotech and antibiotech infor-
mation, the sequencing of this information to
bidders in a session is randomized. If the treat-
ment contains verifiable information, this infor-
mation is always distributed last. This was done
to most closely simulate the environment that
exists in the United States and to be the one
from which the value of verifiable information
should be assessed.
We also use two types of food labels,
a ‘‘plain label’’ identifying only the contents
of a food package and a ‘‘GM label’’ indicat-
ing both the content of the package and
whether the product is produced using GM
ingredients or GM technology. These labels
are plainly designed and clearly displayed on
the front of the food containers (Figure 6).
For each session or trial, the sequencing of
food labels is also randomized; some sessions
receive the plain label first and the GM label
second, and the others receive the GM labels
first and plain labels second. The participants
in each auction session then bid in two rounds
on vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes
that are identical except for food labels.
Hence, each bidder in a session places bids
on a total of six experimental food items:
GM-labeled vegetable oil, plain-labeled vege-
table oil, GM-labeled tortilla chips, plain-
labeled tortilla chips, GM-labeled Russet
potatoes, and plain-labeled Russet potatoes.9
8. When participants in a session received both pro-
biotech and antibiotech information, the order was ran-
domized, so that some participants received the probiotech
information first and others received the antibiotech infor-
mation first. When third-party information was distrib-
uted in a session, it always was distributed after the
other information types.
9. Because all consumers bid on GM-labeled and
plain-labeled food products, our experimental market
emulates a market where mandatory GM labeling is
required (similar to markets in Europe, Japan, and many
other parts of the world). However, in another set of
experiments Huffman et al. (2004) showed that consumers
interpreted labeling in a market with mandatory GM
labeling the same as they interpreted labeling in a market
with voluntary labeling, so our results should not be con-
strained to markets that require mandatory labeling of
GM foods.
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In Step 7, bidders are told that only one
round of bidding on vegetable oil, tortilla
chips, and potatoes will be binding and then
instructed to examine the three food products
and write down their (sealed) bid for each of
them separately. The bids are then collected by
the session monitor and ordered from high to
low. The bidders are now told by the monitor
that they are about to look at another group of
food items.
In Step 8, bidders are informed by the ses-
sion monitor again that only one round of
bidding on food products will be binding,
and then they are asked to examine another
FIGURE 2
Environmental Group Perspective on GM
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group.
General Information
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources
today. There are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly
because unknown adverse effects could be catastrophic! Inadequate safety testing of GM plants,
animals, and food products has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM
foods are safe. Consumers should not have to test new food products to ensure that they are safe.
Scientific Impact
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into
another. This process is very risky. The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM)
foods is the unknown. This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that
consumers will not be harmed. Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that
there would be no harm to consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were
wrong. We do not want consumers to be harmed by GM food.
Human Impact
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems. The potential exists for
allergens to be transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect. For example, if
genes from a peanut were transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats
this new tomato, they could display a peanut allergy.
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue. These foods are
taking genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another. Many people think
it is morally wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level.
Financial Impact
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about
their own profits and ignore possible negative side effects. These groups are actually patenting
different life forms that they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future. Studies
have also shown that GM crops may get lower yields than conventional crops.
Environmental Impact
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards. Sparse testing of
GM plants for environmental impacts has occurred. One potential hazard could be the impact of
GM crops on wildlife. One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM
plants that were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application. The harmful insects and
other pests that get exposed to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of
the potential advantages of GM pest resistance.
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set of experimental commodities—vegetable
oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes. These food
products now have a different label. After
the participants examine these products, they
are instructed by the monitor to place bids on
each of them separately. The bids are then
collected from all the bidders or participants
and ordered from high to low by the session
monitor.
In Step 9, the session monitor randomly
selects among the two rounds of bidding on
vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes for
the binding round and selects the random n.
After both the binding round and the binding
FIGURE 3
Agricultural Biotech Industry Perspective on GM
The following is collection of statements and information on genetic modification
provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.
General Information
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest
discoveries in the history of farming. Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and
disease resistance and weed control. These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology
lead to reduced cost of food production. Future GM food products may have health benefits.
Scientific Impact
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Genetic engineering has brought new
opportunities to farmers for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient
enhanced foods. GM plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in
the history of agriculture. We have just seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential.
Human Impact
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous. A special type of rice
called “golden rice” has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A. This could
be very helpful because the disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world
countries. VAD causes irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible
for over one million deaths annually. Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of
people in the third world, Golden Rice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by
reducing the cases of VAD.
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been
consuming GM foods for years. While every food product may pose risks, there has never been
a documented case of a person getting sick from GM food.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means
lower food prices, and that can help feed the world. In America, lower food prices help decrease
the number of hungry people and also let consumers save a little more money on food.
Worldwide the number of hungry people has been declining, but increased crop production using
GM technology can also help further reduce world hunger.
Environmental Impact
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical
insecticide application by 50 percent or more. This means less environmental damage. GM
weed control is providing new methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till
farming. Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally
helpful discoveries ever.
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nth prices are revealed to bidders by the ses-
sion monitor, the participants who are win-
ners are notified and all participants/bidders
are asked to complete a brief postauction
questionnaire.
In Step 10, the participants/bidders who
are winners, either in one of the two practice
rounds or one of two rounds of bidding on
experimental food items, are told to go to
the stockroom next door to exchange money
for their winning goods, and then they are
free to leave. Bidders who did not win any
product are informed that they are free to
leave immediately.
FIGURE 4
Independent, Third-Party, Verifiable Perspective on GM
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group,
consisting of a variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics. These parties have no financial stake
in genetically modified foods.
General Information
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants
or animals, a process that would not otherwise occur (in common usage, genetic modification
means bioengineering). With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat
similar to the process of how a flu shot works in the human body. Flu shots work by injecting a
virus into the body to help make a human body more resistant to the flu. Bioengineered plant-
pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest resistance.
Scientific Impact
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals,
potatoes, etc.) are based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although
they have been modified slightly from the original plant materials.
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removes
essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils. So even if GM crops were
deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause
harm.
Human Impact
While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers’
shelves, there are currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has
increased nutrient content.
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people. No FDA approved
GM food poses any known unique human health risks.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek
profits. For farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch. However,
genetic modification technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business
industry and farming. The introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to
consumers for groceries.
Environmental Impact
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.
Bioengineered insect resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous
insecticides. More studies are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and
organisms on the environment. A couple of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from
GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects
growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern.
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IV. EFFECTS OF VERIFIABLE
INFORMATION ON WTP
With the information obtained from the
experimental auction sessions, it is possible
to assess the impact of diverse information
and the social value of verifiable information
on consumers’ WTP for food products that
might be GM at the time of the experiments.
We first examine bidding behavior for GM-
labeled food items with and without verifiable
information on genetic modification. Follow-
ing Viscusi and Evans (1990), we expect that
bidders will react rationally to biotech industry
and environmental group perspectives. With-
out verifiable information, we expect bidder’s
demand for GM foods to shift rightward when
the biotech industry perspective is injected into
the experiment and leftward when the environ-
mental group perspective is provided. We per-
form both unconditional and conditional
analyses of the bid prices submitted by the auc-
tion participants, denoted ‘‘bidders.’’
We first present summary statistics for our
sample and then an unconditional analysis of
our data on bidders’ behavior. The attributes
of the auction participants or bidders are sum-
marized in Table 1, and they are representative
of the populations from which they are drawn.
In Table 2, participants’ bids in the laboratory
auction experiments are summarized. In Part
A, mean bid prices across all information
and labeling treatments are displayed. On
average, bidders discounted GM-labeled food
items by 14% relative to exactly the same food
items having a plain-food label. Part B shows
that bidders who received only the biotech
industry perspective are willing, on average,
to pay a small premium for GM-labeled food
items for two of the three products. This
occurred despite the fact that genetic modifica-
tion is only used to enhance attributes that
might be expected to lower farmers’ produc-
tion costs and not otherwise to directly benefit
consumers, for example, by enhancing nutrient
content or improving shelf life. Part C shows
that when bidders receive only the environ-
mental group perspective, they discount the
GM-labeled food items by an average of
35% relative to the plain-labeled food item.
Part D shows that bidders who receive both
the biotech industry and environmental group
perspectives discount GM-labeled foods by an
FIGURE 5
Treatments: Information and Labeling Combinations Assigned
Session
Pro-biotech and Anti-biotech
Information Treatments
Disseminated
Third-party
Information
Disseminated
Round with GM
Labels
1. Pro-biotech Yes 1
2. Anti-biotech Yes 1
3. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 1
4. Pro-biotech Yes 2
5. Anti-biotech Yes 2
6 Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 2
7 Pro-biotech No 1
8 Anti-biotech No 1
9. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 1
10. Pro-biotech No 2
11. Anti-biotech No 2
12. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 2
_____________________________________________________________________________
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average of 17%–29% across the three experi-
mental food products.
An important issue is the size of the impact
of verifiable information. Table 2, Part E,
shows that bidders who receive both the bio-
tech industry and environmental group per-
spectives discount GM-labeled food items
only slightly relative to the plain-labeled food
items. These differences, however, are not sta-
tistically significant relative to the bids from
those who only receive the probiotech (biotech
industry) perspective. In contrast, bidders who
receive only the biotech industry perspective
value GM-labeled foods higher than the
plain-labeled counterpart.
Table 2, Part F, shows that bidders who
receive both antibiotech and verifiable informa-
tion discount theGM-labeled foods by an aver-
age of 17%–22% across the three experimental
food items. Bidders who receive antibiotech,
probiotech, and verifiable information are more
accepting of the GM-labeled foods than those
who receive probiotech (biotech industry) and
antibiotech (environmental group) perspec-
tives. The bidders who receive the sixth infor-
mation treatment—probiotech, antibiotech, and
verifiable information—discount the GM-
labeled food by an average of 0%–11% across
the three food items.
Given the interest in the effects of verifiable
information on bidders’ behavior, we perform
a test of a null hypothesis of no effect versus
significant effects using a Wilcoxon rank sum
test. This testing is conducted as part of a more
extensive analysis of the unconditional analy-
sis of bidders’ behavior. The effects of verifi-
able information on bidders who receive the
antibiotech perspective are reported in Table 3,
and they show a statistically significant effect
of verifiable information on bidding behavior
at the 5% level for vegetable oil, 10% level for
tortilla chips, and 5% level for potatoes. The
differences in bids when verifiable information
is introduced for those who previously re-
ceived both the biotech industry and environ-
mental group perspectives are statistically
FIGURE 6
GM- and Plain-Food Labels Used: Potatoes, Chips, and Oil
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM).
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM).
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM).
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
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significant at the 10% level using the Wilcoxon
rank sum test for potatoes, but are not signif-
icantly different from zero for tortilla chips or
vegetable oil (Table 3).
While information from unconditional
analysis of the bid prices is suggestive, multiple
regression analysis of bid prices allows us to
control for possible confounding factors, for
example, a bidder’s gender, age, and income,
and for the censoring of bids. The regression
model holds bidders’ tastes constant for each
of the experimental food products by defining
the dependent variable to be the difference in
a bidder’s bid prices for plain-labeled (nonla-
beled) and GM-labeled (labeled) food items.
The bidder’s inverse demand equation for
the plain-labeled food item is
Pnonlabeledj 5 b
nonlabeled
1 þ bnonlabeled2 Xj2
þ lnonlabeledj
ð1Þ
and for the GM-labeled food item is
Plabeledj 5 b
labeled
1 þ blabeled2 Xj2 þ llabeledj ;ð2Þ
where Pj represents the price bid for a food
item by bidder j, b1 is an intercept term,
Xj2 is a vector of exogenous variables associ-
ated with the bidder and other information,
b2 is the associated vector of regression coef-
ficients, and lj is a random disturbance rep-
resenting other unmeasured effects. It is
assumed to have a zero mean and to be nor-
mally distributed.
Subtracting Equation (2) from Equation
(1), we obtain an equation in which the depen-
dent variable is the bidder’s difference in bid
prices for the two products:
Pnonlabeledj Plabeledj 5bnonlabeled1 blabeled1
þbnonlabeled2 blabeled2 Xj2
þlnonlabeledj llabeledj :
ð3Þ
The coefficients and error terms can be con-
densed and rewritten as
Pnonlabeledj  Plabeledj 5 b1 þ b2Xj2 þ lj :ð4Þ
Hence, the difference in bid prices is then
explained by an intercept term b1, a vector
of slope terms b2 that is multiplied by a vector
of exogenous characteristicsXj2, and a random
disturbance term lj 5 l
nonlabeled
j  llabeledj :10
If a bidder submits a zero bid for nonlabeled
food product or for a labeled food product,
disturbance term lj in Equation (4) is censored
TABLE 1
Variables for Auction Participants-Bidders and Sample Summary Statistics (N 5 172)
Variable Definitions Mean Standard Deviation
Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49
Age The participant’s age 49.5 17.5
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47
Education Years of schooling 14.54 2.25
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.78 1.65
Income The households income level (in thousands) 57.0 32.6
White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30
Read_La 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.11
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.40
Informeda 1 if an individual considered themselves at least
somewhat informed regarding GM foods
0.42 0.49
Labels1 1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels in round 1 0.52 0.50
aPreexperiment information.
10. Because no bid price is revealed until all bids are
placed and participants in a session were restricted from
talking with each other, we anticipate no contemporane-
ous correlation of random disturbance terms across bid-
ders in a session.
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TABLE 2
Mean Bids for Participants-Bidders, Excluding Double-Zero Bids
Commodity/Type N Mean Bid Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Mean bids—all bidders and treatments
GM oil 146 1.07 0.81 0.99 0 3.99
Oil 146 1.24 0.78 1.00 0 3.79
GM chips 155 1.03 0.85 0.99 0 3.99
Chips 155 1.20 0.81 1.00 0.05 4.99
GM potatoes 159 0.84 0.66 0.75 0 3
Potatoes 159 0.98 0.65 0.89 0 3.89
A. Mean bids when bidders received only probiotech information
GM oil 26 1.56 0.73 1.50 0 2.99
Oil 26 1.54 0.79 1.55 0 3.50
GM chips 30 1.31 0.72 1.13 0 2.99
Chips 30 1.36 0.72 1.18 0.05 2.99
GM potatoes 27 1.30 0.71 1.25 0 2.50
Potatoes 27 1.26 0.67 1.25 0 2.00
B. Mean bids when bidders received only antibiotech information
GM oil 26 0.79 0.82 0.50 0 3.25
Oil 26 1.22 0.65 1.00 0.25 2.49
GM chips 29 0.81 0.94 0.50 0 3.99
Chips 29 1.25 1.02 1.00 0.05 4.99
GM potatoes 29 0.61 0.68 0.50 0 2.75
Potatoes 29 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.05 3.89
C. Mean bids when bidders received both probiotech and antibiotech information
GM oil 24 0.68 0.55 0.50 0 1.79
Oil 24 0.90 0.72 0.85 0 3.00
GM chips 23 0.68 0.74 0.35 0 2.25
Chips 23 0.81 0.79 0.49 0.05 2.75
GM potatoes 26 0.50 0.39 0.50 0 1.50
Potatoes 26 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.05 1.60
D. Mean bids when bidders received probiotech and verifiable information
GM oil 26 1.12 0.62 1.00 0 2.39
Oil 26 1.14 0.57 1.00 0.10 2.39
GM chips 25 1.24 0.77 1.19 0 2.79
Chips 25 1.33 0.73 1.16 0.20 2.89
GM potatoes 26 0.92 0.45 0.99 0 1.85
Potatoes 26 0.93 0.39 0.99 0.25 1.90
E. Mean bids when bidders received antibiotech and verifiable information
GM oil 21 1.33 1.05 1.25 0 3.99
Oil 21 1.60 0.97 1.50 0.49 3.79
GM chips 25 1.12 0.97 0.99 0 3.50
Chips 25 1.38 0.77 1.01 0.49 3.00
GM potatoes 27 0.89 0.77 0.89 0 3.00
Potatoes 27 1.14 0.67 0.99 0.50 3.00
F. Mean bids when bidders received probiotech, antibiotech, and verifiable information
GM oil 23 0.94 0.77 0.95 0 2.75
Oil 23 1.06 0.82 1.00 0.05 3.29
GM chips 23 0.95 0.81 0.85 0 3.25
Chips 23 0.95 0.66 0.99 0.1 2.89
GM potatoes 24 0.82 0.61 1.00 0 1.99
Potatoes 24 0.84 0.55 0.84 0.01 2.00
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(Greene 2003, 761–66). The censoring scenarios
are as follows. Case 1: bidder j bids a positive
amount for both theGM-labeled and the plain-
labeled food item; the measured difference in
bid prices for bidders is the difference between
the two bid prices. Case 2: bidder j bids zero for
the GM-labeled product and a positive amount
for the plain-labeled product. The ‘‘true differ-
ence’’ in a bidder’s bid price with the censored
regression will be greater than the difference
between the two observed bid prices. This arises
because the bids on the GM-labeled food items
are censored at zero, and this outcome is trans-
mitted directly to the disturbance in Equation
(4). Case 3: bidder j bids a positive amount
for the GM-labeled product and zero for the
plain-labeled product. As in Case 2, the true
difference in a bidder’s bid prices for the cen-
sored regression is absolutely larger than the
measured difference between his or her two
bid prices. Case 4: bidder j bids zero for both
the plain- andGM-labeled food items. This lat-
ter outcome does not give any information
about a bidder’s true demand forGMproducts.
A positive aspect of using the censored
regressionmodel for a bidder’s bid price differ-
ences11 and associated random disturbances is
that zero bid prices are accounted for correctly
and bias effects from zero bids are minimized.
The disadvantage is that the model is not lin-
ear in its unknown parameters and compound
disturbance. Least squares estimation is no
longer feasible, but maximum likelihood esti-
mation of Equation (4), including censoring, is
feasible and reasonable (Greene 2003). Tests
of joint null hypotheses on the regression coef-
ficients in Equation (4) against an alternative
of negation can be performed using the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic, k 5 Lr/Lu. Lu and Lr
are the values of the maximum of the ‘‘unre-
stricted’’ likelihood function [Equation (4),
including censoring] and the maximum of the
likelihood function after restrictions con-
tained in the null hypothesis are imposed on
the unrestricted model (Greene 2003, 484–86).
k is the sample value of the likelihood ratio
for a particular unrestricted model and null
hypothesis. In large samples, 2 ln (Lr/Lu) is
distributed approximately as chi-squared, with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of
restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis
on the parameters of the unrestricted model
(Greene 2003, 484–86).
Now we turn to maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the regression coefficients in Equa-
tion (4), including censoring. To increase the
power of the statistical tests with the econo-
metric model, we pool the observations on bid
price differences across the three commodities.
Hence, the sample size for this fitted model is
516 (5 172 3). Dummy variables are defined
for each of the three types of information
(probiotech, antibiotech, and verifiable), and
TABLE 3
Results from Test of Null Hypothesis of No Significant Difference in Bid Prices between Pairs of
Information Treatments
Commodity/Information Type
Reduction in the Premium for
Plain-Labeled Version of
Food Products When Third-Party,
Verifiable Information Is Introduced
One-Sided p Value from
Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test Statistic
Potatoes, pro-GM info $ 0.05 0.34
Vegetable oil, pro-GM info $0.00 0.30
Tortilla chips, pro-GM info $ 0.04 0.38
Potatoes, anti-GM info $0.14 0.07
Vegetable oil, anti-GM info $0.16** 0.05
Tortilla chips, anti-GM info $0.18 0.13
Potatoes, both pro- and anti-GM info $0.18** 0.03
Vegetable oil, both pro- and anti-GM info $0.06 0.28
Tortilla chips, both pro- and anti-GM info $0.13 0.28
**Statistical significance at 5% level.
11. Our censored regression model is a more general
form of the common tobit model (Greene 2003). While
a tobit model, the dependent variable or associated distur-
bance is censored, but given Equations (1) and (2) and zero
bids, we have a disturbance term lj 5 l
nonlabeled
j 
llabeledj ;which can have censoring on one or both of its
components—the bid for the plain- and/or GM-labeled
products.
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indicators for probiotech and antibiotech sep-
arately are included, plus interactions between
probiotech and antibiotech, probiotech and
verifiable, antibiotech and verifiable, and all
three information types. Other regressors
include a bidder’s gender and household
income, a dummy variable taking a value of
1 if a bidder saw the GM label in the first trail
(and zero otherwise), and a dummy variable
indicating a value of 1 if the bidder perceives
herself/himself to be informed about GM
foods before the auction (and zero other-
wise).12 These latter regressors allow us to con-
trol for selective demographic attributes of
bidders and to examine how a bidder’s prior
knowledge about GM foods or GM technol-
ogies affects WTP and demand.
Table 4 displays the basic maximum likeli-
hood regression results and associated stan-
dard errors.13 Commodity fixed effects are
included, but no intercept term is included.
The estimated coefficients for information
treatment effects show that in auction sessions
where bidders receive only antibiotech infor-
mation the bid price differences are larger
(between GM and plain labeled) and statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level. When bidders
receive only probiotech information, bid price
differences are reduced, but the difference is
not significantly different from zero at the
5% (or 10%) level. When bidders receive both
probiotech and antibiotech information, the
bid price difference is reduced, but it also is
not statistically significant. From these results,
we conclude that in those sessions where bid-
ders receive only antibiotech or both probio-
tech and antibiotech information, they bid
differently than where they receive only pro-
biotech information.
When bidders are in sessions that receive
probiotech and verifiable information, the
impact of this combination is not statistically
significant. When bidders are in sessions that
receive antibiotech and verifiable information,
bid price differences are reduced, and the differ-
ence is significantly different from zero. Hence,
those who receive antibiotech information
along with verifiable information discount
GM foods less than those who receive only
antibiotech information. When bidders are in
sessions that receive all three types of informa-
tion (probiotech, antibiotech, and verifiable),
the impact of this treatment on bid price differ-
ences is small and not statistically significant.
Hence, in this complex setting, verifiable infor-
mation does not have a distinguishable effect.
To focus more specifically on the potential
significance of verifiable information on bid-
ders’ behavior, we perform a joint test that
verifiable information has no effect on bid-
der’s behavior. We do this by deleting the
three information treatments from Equation
(4) that include verifiable information as a
component of a treatment. The sample value
of the chi-squared statistic for this test is
7.17 with 3 degrees of freedom, and at a
10% significance level, the tabled chi-squared
is 6.97. Hence, verifiable information has a
TABLE 4
Estimates of Pooled Censored Regressions
Explaining Bid Price Differences in GM-
Labeled and Plain-Labeled Foods Using
a Commodity Fixed Effects Model (n 5 516,
Standard Errors Are in Parentheses)a
Regressors Coefficients
Dependent variable: bid price plain-labeled
food less bid price GM-labeled food
Probiotech 0.073 (0.097)
Antibiotech 0.432** (0.093)
Probiotech  antibiotech 0.199 (0.131)
Probiotech  verifiable 0.007 (0.088)
Antibiotech  verifiable 0.205** (0.090)
Probiotech  antibiotech  verifiable 0.065 (0.157)
Other variables
Labels-Round 1 0.115** (0.053)
Gender 0.045 (0.054)
Income 0.00001** (0.0000)
Informed 0.093* (0.054)
Chi-squared excluding three
regressors containing
verifiable information
7.177*
Chi-squared for no explanatory
power of regressors
76.44**
aThe estimated coefficients for the commodity fixed
effects are not reported.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
12. Several other models that included the bidder’s
age, marital status, religious upbringing, and educational
attainment as regressors were fitted. None of these varia-
bles, however, impacted the difference in bid prices in a sta-
tistically significant way (at the 10% level).
13. Ordinary least squares regressions were also fitted
to 172 observations and to the observations remaining
after ‘‘double-zero’’ bids were excluded. The results for
these regressions are similar and are available from the
authors upon request.
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statistically significant effect on bidders’ WTP
for commodities that might be GM.
Other results include the following: bidders
who have larger household incomes discount
GM by a larger amount than those with less
household income. This result is statistically
significant at the 5% level and is consistent
with non-GM products being viewed on aver-
age by bidders as a superior product. Those
bidders who consider themselves to be at least
‘‘somewhat informed about GM foods’’ (as
recorded in the preauction survey) discount
GM-labeled foods by more than other bid-
ders. This effect is statistically significant (at
the 10% level). Moreover, this result suggests
that bidders in our experiments who are ‘‘GM
informed’’ have on average acquired/received
negative information about GM foods prior
to the experiment.14 Bids also are affected
by the labeling sequence. Bidders who are in
sessions that bid on the GM-labeled food
products in Round 1 (and the plain-labeled
food products in Round 2) discount GM-
labeled foods by less than those who are in ses-
sions that bid on the products in the opposite
order. The regression coefficient for this
regressor is statistically significant at the 5%
level, and the result reinforces the importance
of randomized assignment of treatments to
sessions in experimental auctions, which is
an innovation in our methodology. Finally,
we perform a joint test of no explanatory
power of Equation (4) when fitted to the
pooled data with commodity fixed effects
and censoring. The sample value of the chi-
squared statistic is 18.6 with 10 degrees of free-
dom. The tabled value of the chi-squared sta-
tistic at the 5% significance level is 18.3. Hence,
this null hypothesis of no explanatory power
of Equation (4) is rejected.
V. METHODOLOGY FOR VALUING VERIFIABLE
INFORMATION
In the previous section, we showed that
independent verifiable information affects bid-
ders’ bids on food products that may be GM,
given the presence of information from inter-
ested parties. We now summarize the method-
ology used to estimate the public good value of
verifiable information. First, consider the em-
pirical specification of the model leading to the
public good value of verifiable information.
Our approach is similar to the approach taken
by Foster and Just (1989) and Teisl et al.
(2001). Information has value if an agent’s ob-
servable behavior changes. For our case, in-
formation has social value if a participant/
consumer changes his/her behavior as a result
of receiving the information, that is, they
‘‘switched products that they purchased’’—
from GM-labeled to plain-labeled foods, or
vice versa.15
Consider the two types of bidders that ben-
efit from verifiable information. One type pur-
chases GM-labeled food before receiving
verifiable information and then switches to
plain-labeled food after receiving verifiable
information. The second type purchases
plain-labeled food before receiving verifiable
information and switches to GM-labeled food
after receiving the same information.
The economist’s task is to approximate the
net welfare change for bidders who change
their observed behavior after receiving verifi-
able information. Because we are trying to
assess the average value of information for
each product, we assume all bidders purchase
either the GM-labeled version or the plain-
labeled version of a product. The bidder’s sur-
plus is approximated by the difference between
his/her WTP and the ‘‘market price’’ (i.e., the
price consumers would pay for a product in a
store) for the product he/she purchases. Bidder
j’s consumer surplus from purchasing plain-
labeled food or GM-labeled food is defined
to be:
surplus
j
PL 5WTP
j
PL MP jPLð5Þ
surplus
j
GML 5WTP
j
GML MP jGML:ð6Þ
In Equations (5) and (6), the bidder’s WTP
is revealed in the experimental auctions, MP is
the price the bidder faces for the product in the
marketplace, the superscript j refers to bidder
j, and the subscripts PL and GML refer to the
14. See Huffman et al. (2006) for an analysis of the
impact of bidders’ prior beliefs about GM technology
on their WTP for food items that might be GM.
15. Note that our model does not assume an auction
market but a conventional market. But auctions are essen-
tial for this analysis because our auction market elicits the
nonhypothetical WTP under different information treat-
ments that is not obtainable in a conventional market.
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plain-labeled and GM-labeled products in this
section.16
A consumer or bidder purchases either the
GM-labeled or plain-labeled food product.
The product that bidder j purchases is assumed
to be the one that gives him/her the higher sur-
plus. Formally, if surplus
j
PL.surplus
j
GML; then
buy PL
j
I 5 1 and buy GML
j
I 5 0 and if
surplus
j
PL,surplus
j
GML; then buy PL
j
I 5 0 and
buy GML
j
I 5 1, where the subscript I refers
to the information setting (whether or not the
consumer has received verifiable information).
Those who purchase the plain-labeled product
after receiving verifiable information obtain
PREMGAIN
j
PL 5 surplus
j
PL
 surplus jGML:
ð7Þ
Similarly, those who purchase the GM-
labeled product after receiving verifiable infor-
mation gain:
PREMGAIN
j
GML 5 surplus
j
GML
 surplus jPL:
ð8Þ
Although all bidders enjoy the premium
gained by consuming one product instead of
another, as shown in Expressions (7) and (8),
the premium gained represents the increase
in welfare (i.e., the value of information) only
for those who switch products.
We next discuss the method used to estimate
the percentage of bidders who change pur-
chases when verifiable information is intro-
duced. First, the percentage of bidders who
purchase GM-labeled products is denoted:
percentbuyGM I 5
X
j
buy GML
j
K

=N :
ð9Þ
Equation (9) shows that this number can be
represented as the summation across bidders
who purchase the GM-labeled version of the
commodity divided by the total number of
bidders. Therefore, the percentage of bidders
who purchase the plain-labeled version is 1
 percentbuyGMI.
Verifiable information causes a bidder to
switch purchases if his or her surplus is higher
for one product version (e.g., the plain-labeled
product) prior to receiving verifiable informa-
tion, but higher for the other product version
(e.g., the GM-labeled product) after receiving
verifiable information. The net change in the
percentage who purchase the GM-labeled
product due to the introduction of verifiable
information is the (absolute) difference
between the ‘‘percentage who purchase GM-
labeled foods when treated to verifiable infor-
mation’’ and the ‘‘percentage who purchase
GM-labeled foods but do not receive the ver-
ifiable information’’ given the other informa-
tion they have received:
PercentswitchK 5 jpercentbuyGMverifiable
percentbuyGMno verifiablej:
ð10Þ
In Equation (10), the percentage of bidders
who switched purchases is estimated as the ab-
solute value of the difference in the percentage
who purchase the GM-labeled food with and
without verifiable information. The super-
script K represents either GM-labeled or plain-
labeled foods, depending on which product
bidders are switching to.
Who switches purchases once verifiable
information is introduced? Because bidders
who receive given information treatments
are in distinct experimental sessions, we do
not know the specific persons who switch,
but we can compute the percentage of the sam-
ple that switched after the introduction of ver-
ifiable information. To do this, we assume that
the bidders who switch have relative preferen-
ces for the food products that are uniformly
distributed across the population that con-
sumes the good that was abandoned. For
example, we assume that bidders who
switched to GM-labeled foods after receiving
verifiable information had relative valuations
of plain-labeled foods that were evenly distrib-
uted throughout the population of consumers
16. In computing this value of verifiable information,
we used ‘‘market’’ prices that we paid for plain-labeled veg-
etable oil, yellow tortilla chips, and Russet potatoes as the
market price for plain-labeled product: $1.65 for the 32
ounce bottle of vegetable oil, $2.99 for the 16 ounce bag
of tortilla chips, and $1.79 for the 5 pound bag of potatoes
as the prices for the plain-labeled products. For market
price of GM-labeled product, we adjusted the market price
of plain-labeled price for the average GM discount in our
experiment. Therefore, the estimated market prices for the
GM-labeled products were $1.48 for the oil, $2.82 for the
tortilla chips, and $1.65 for the potatoes.
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who purchased the plain-labeled foods before
information was introduced. Thus, without
verifiable information, treated and untreated
participants have the same behavior.
We now compute the probability of a par-
ticipant being a ‘‘switcher’’—one who changes
his or her behavior after verifiable information
is introduced:
prob switchGML 5 Percentswitch
GML=
percentbuyGMverifiable:
ð11Þ
prob switchPL 5 Percentswitch
PL=
percentbuynonGMverifiable:
ð12Þ
Todetermine the expected value of verifiable
information to a participant, we multiply his or
her premium surplus (PREMGAIN) by the
probability that he or she switched products:
EVpersonj 5 PREMGAINjGML
 prob switchjGML
þPREMGAINjPL
 prob switchjPL:
ð13Þ
In Equation (13), EVpersonj is the expected
value of information to bidder j.17 One can
also think of this as the average value of verifi-
able information across all bidders or partic-
ipants. What is important is that we can
compute this value for each of the three prod-
ucts and over different initial information
treatments.
Next, we need the expected value of infor-
mation to a bidder who switches purchases.
This is computed by dividing the expected value
of verifiable information per person by the per-
centage of bidders who switched purchases:
EVswitcher 5 EVpersonj=percentswitch:
ð14Þ
In Equation (14), EVswitcher is the average
value of verifiable information to a bidder who
switches his or her purchase of a food product,
either to GM-labeled food from plain-labeled,
or vice versa.18
In summary, the experimental auction data
collected for this study allow us to calculate
the percentage of bidders who switch in each
of the information settings: receiving the
probiotech perspective, the antibiotech per-
spective, and both pro- and antibiotech per-
spectives. We then estimate an expected
value of verifiable information per experiment
participant or bidder and suggest that it might
be appropriate to apply this number to the
whole U.S. population.
Now consider the estimated value of verifi-
able information. For each commodity, Table 5
presents the marginal percentage of bidders
who would switch, the value of verifiable
information to a person who would switch,
and the expected value of verifiable informa-
tion to a person in society. When a bidder
receives only the biotech industry perspective,
one might expect the introduction of verifiable
information to cause some individuals to
switch to plain-labeled foods. For example,
among those bidders who receive both biotech
industry and verifiable information, some are
more likely to purchase GM-labeled potatoes
but are less likely to purchase the GM-labeled
tortilla chips than bidders who receive only
the biotech industry perspective. The share
of bidders who would switch to either of these
goods, however, is small. Among those bid-
ders who first received biotech industry infor-
mation, the expected value of the verifiable
information per person was about one-half cent
per product but was only statistically significant
for the potatoes.
While verifiable information brought about
virtually no change in bidding behavior for
tortilla chips and potatoes, bidders who re-
ceived biotech industry and verifiable infor-
mation were much more likely to purchase
GM-labeled vegetable oil than bidders who
receive only the industry perspective. Approx-
imately 15% of the bidders who received the
biotech industry perspective would switch
from plain-labeled vegetable oil to GM-
labeled vegetable oil after the introduction
of the verifiable information. This outcome17. Note that because it is assumed that auction par-
ticipants consume either GM- or plain-labeled food prod-
ucts, that only one of the two PREMGAIN coefficients
will be positive, while the other is zero. The PREMGAIN
coefficients will also differ across participants.
18. The SAS code used to estimate the value of infor-
mation is available from the authors upon request.
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is consistent with verifiable information
revealing that vegetable oils do not contain
DNA because all the protein-carrying DNA
is boiled out in refining vegetable oils for
human consumption. Vegetable oils made
from GM and non-GM soybeans are chemi-
cally and nutritionally indistinguishable. Bid-
ders worried about their own health now
become more likely to purchase GM-labeled
vegetable oil, even if they do not change their
attitude toward other GM-labeled products.
Among those bidders who receive biotech
industry information, the average value per
person of verifiable information to those who
switch to the GM-labeled vegetable oil is almost
21 cents per switcher, and the expected value per
person is just over 3 cents per bottle. These
value estimates are statistically significant at
the 1% level using a t-test (Table 5).19 This
is interesting because among bidders who
received biotech industry information, virtu-
ally all the surplus gain arose from vegetable
oil and little from the other two products.
In another scenario, some bidders received
either the environmental group perspective
only or both the biotech industry and envi-
ronmental group perspectives. We now con-
sider the value of verifiable information in
these cases. We expect that bidders who ini-
tially received only the environmental group
perspective onGM foods and later were given
the verifiable information will be more likely
to purchase GM-labeled foods. Our results
confirm this hypothesis. For all three exper-
imental food products, a significant share
of the sample would switch from plain-
labeled to the GM-labeled food under these
circumstances: between 18.6% and 28.2% of
bidders would switch to the GM-labeled food,
across the three commodities. The value of
verifiable information for each bidder who
switches ranges from 18 to 25 cents per food
item, and the expected value of information
per person in the experiments is 5.1 cents per
bag of tortilla chips, 5.4 cents per bottle of veg-
etable oil, and 4.5 cents per bag of potatoes.
These values of information estimates are all
statistically significant at either the 1% or
5% level (Table 5).
TABLE 5
Value of Verifiable Information about Genetic Modification and GM Foods to
Participants-Bidders
Participants Switching to GM
Percentage Value per Person Average Overall Value
A. Value to bidders who originally received pro-biotech informationa
Tortilla chips (N 5 25) 3.3a $0.112/bag $0.004/bag, t value 5 1.54
Vegetable oil (N 5 26) 15.4 $0.209/bottle $0.032/bottle**, t value 5 4.25
Potatoes (N 5 26) 3.3 $0.184/bag $0.006/bag**, t value 5 6.01
B. Value to bidders who originally received only antibiotech informationb
Tortilla chips (N 5 25) 18.6 $0.250/bag $0.051/bag**, t value 5 2.91
Vegetable oil (N 5 21) 28.2 $0.190/bottle $0.054/bottle*, t value 5 2.75
Potatoes (N 5 27) 25.0 $0.179/bag $0.045/bag**, t value 5 5.89
C. Value to bidders who originally received both pro-biotech and antibiotech informationc
Tortilla chips (N 5 23) 8.7 $0.233/bag $0.020/bag**, t value 5 3.77
Vegetable oil (N 5 23) 15.9 $0.280/bottle $0.044/bottle**, t value 5 3.29
Potatoes (N 5 24) 21.5 $0.298/bag $0.064/bag**, t value 5 3.48
aOn average, more individuals purchased the GM-labeled potatoes and GM-labeled vegetable oil when they received
probiotech and verifiable information as opposed to just getting probiotech information, but fewer individuals purchased
the GM-labeled tortilla chips than their plain-labeled counterpart when they received probiotech and verifiable information.
bConsumers who received antibiotech and verifiable information were more accepting of GM foods than individuals who
only received antibiotech information.
cConsumers who received probiotech, antibiotech, and verifiable information were more accepting of GM foods than
individuals who only received probiotech and antibiotech information.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level using a t-test.
**Statistically significant at the 1% level using a t-test.
19. For all value of information test statistics, we also
ran a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test and found
similar results.
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Bidders who receive biotech industry and
environmental group perspectives first and
then receive verifiable information are more
likely to purchase GM-labeled foods than bid-
ders who do not receive verifiable information.
The share of bidders who switch from plain-
labeled foods to GM-labeled foods is smaller
for each of the three goods in this auction
when compared to the bidders who receive
the environmental group perspective, but larger
for each food item when compared to bidders
who receive only the biotech industry perspec-
tive. Only 8.7% of bidders would switch to the
GM-labeled tortilla chips, while 15.9% and
21.5% would switch to the GM-labeled
vegetable oil and GM-labeled potatoes. More-
over, the average value of verifiable informa-
tion per person who would switch from the
plain-labeled to GM-labeled food ranged
from 23 to 30 cents across the three food prod-
ucts. In this scenario, the implied expected
value of verifiable information was 2 cents per
bag of tortilla chips, 4.4 cents per bottle of veg-
etable oil, and 6.4 cents for each bag of potatoes
(Table 5).20
Suppose we take a bold step and prepare
a ‘‘ballpark’’ estimate of the value of verifiable
information on genetic modification for the
whole U.S. population. Generalizing is not
without some risks, but the generalization is
also illustrative. Our estimate is that the value
of verifiable information is about 4 cents per
food product for participants who have heard
either the environmental group perspective or
both environmental group and biotech indus-
try perspectives on GM foods. Because the
prices for these three food products in units
that we used in our experiment were typically
between $1.50 and $2.50, verifiable informa-
tion has a value of approximately 2% of the
purchase price for products that could be GM.
Estimates of the share of grocery store
foods that are GM vary. Some observers sug-
gest that two-thirds of all processed foods in
the United States contain some GM material
(Davis 2001). Others argue that one-third of
all products in a grocery store contain GM
material (Friends of the Earth 2001). To pro-
vide a conservative estimate, we approximate
the aggregate value of verifiable information
by assuming that only one-third of all prod-
ucts on a grocer’s shelf were GM at the time
of our experiments in April 2001.
In 1997, U.S. citizens spent $390 billion for
food at home (Putnum and Allshouse 1999).
Applying the one-third rule, we suggest that
Americans spent roughly $130 billion on foods
that might be GM. If verifiable information
has a value of about 2% of the price for these
foods, and if one generalizes these results, our
estimate of the potential public good value to
U.S. consumers of verifiable information is
about $2.6 billion annually. While large, the
aggregate value does not seem totally unreal-
istic. Two and six-tenths billion dollars is only
an average value of approximately $9.00 per
year for every U.S. man, woman, and child.
As a reference point, Foster and Just (1989)
reported a value of government information
about pesticide-contaminated milk in Hawaii
of approximately $10.00 per person per month
($120.00 per year), using similar techniques.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have presented a new methodology for
testing and valuing the effects of objective
third-party or verifiable information in a mar-
ket with conflicting information. Our results
show that the perspectives of interested parties
are consequential in an auctionmarket setting;
probiotech information distributed by the bio-
tech industry has significantly negative effects
on bid price differences between plain- and
GM-labeled product, and antibiotech infor-
mation distributed by environmental NGOs
has significantly positive effects on bid price
differences for food that might be GM. How-
ever, no single type of information is dominant,
although the empirical impacts of probiotech
and verifiable information have similarities.
In an environment that is roughly similar to
the situation that exists in the United States
today, which is one of voluntary GM labeling,
we show that verifiable information has a
20. Recall that we had to use estimated prices for the
GM-labeled products to compute the value of informa-
tion, and we are using the mean discount for GM-labeled
foods to estimate these prices. We consider the impact of
used alternative prices. One alternative set of prices
yielded a greater premium for plain-labeled foods (prices
for GM-labeled products estimated to be $1.38 for the oil,
$2.72 for the tortilla chips, and $1.58 for the potatoes), and
one that yielded a smaller premium for plain-labeled foods
(prices for GM-labeled products estimated to be $1.57 for
the oil, $2.91 for the tortilla chips, and $1.72 for the pota-
toes). The average value of information for the three food
products was 5 cents and 3 cents per product for the
greater and smaller plain-labeled premiums, respectively.
Thus, our results are relatively robust to the estimated
prices.
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significant effect on bid price differences when
participants have not received probiotech in-
formation, and more generally, when our data
on bidding behavior are pooled across all three
commodities. We expect similar results in
other developed countries that have voluntary
labeling policies. Furthermore, we argue that
verifiable information has its greatest impact
and hence greatest potential social value, when
interested parties are disseminating informa-
tion that is quite negative about the new tech-
nologies. However, if the resistance were to
disappear, the value of verifiable information
would be greatly reduced.
Verifiable information has value when it
changes the behavior of consumers. We make
several simplifying assumptions and produce
a calculation suggesting that verifiable infor-
mation on genetic modification might have
an annual social value to U.S. consumers
through food purchases of $2.6 billion annu-
ally. This might seem high, but it is expected to
decrease over time if reputable sources of ver-
ifiable information for GM foods and technol-
ogies were established in the United States.
The exact details of how such a system might
function or be financed are summarized in
Huffman and Tegene (2002).
Our new methodology for assessing the im-
pacts and value of conflicting and third-party
information on consumers’ WTP for new
goods items can be adapted to a range of
new consumer goods, for example, fresh fruit
with reduced bruising, food fortified with pro-
tein and vitamins, and new drugs. In particular,
policy makers could use our methodology to
assess the public good benefit of new informa-
tion for controversial commodities and com-
pare these benefits to their expected social cost.
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